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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
BRUCE AARON ELLIS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 890657-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1989) and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989), whereby a defendant in a district 
court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals 
from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other than a 
first degree or capital felony. 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and 
constitutional provisions are provided in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4) (1990) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (1990) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (Supp. 1989) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1)(b) (Supp. 1989) 
Utah R. Evid. 403 
STATEMENT OF THE IS8UES 
Did the trial court err in precluding the jury from 
considering the defendant's theory regarding the lesser included 
offense of simple assault? 
Did the trial court err when it denied the defendant's 
motion to exclude the photographs marked State's Exhibits Nos. 1-8? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"Each party is . . . entitled to have the jury instructed on 
the law applicable to its theory of the case if there is any 
reasonable basis in the evidence to justify it." State v. Torres. 
619 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1980). 
A trial court's decision regarding the admissibility of 
potentially prejudicial photographs is subject to an "abuse of 
discretion" standard. State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1257 (Utah 
1988). If the trial court erred in its decision, appellate courts 
"must determine the harmfulness of the trial court's error." Id. 
"A conviction will not be reversed because of the erroneous admission 
of evidence absent a showing that the error likely affected the 
substantial rights of the defendant." State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 
754 (Utah 1986). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for 
aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-103(1)(b) (Supp. 1989). Following a two day jury trial 
beginning on September 27f 1989, in the Third Judicial District 
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Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Scott Daniels, presiding, the court sentenced Bruce Aaron Ellis to 
an indeterminate term of zero to five years at the Utah State Prison 
and a $5000 fine (with a 25% surcharge). (R 89). The court stayed 
the sentence and placed Bruce Ellis on probation. (R 89). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On June 29, 1989, at approximately 5:00 p.m., Steven Drew 
gave a co-worker, Stephen Evans, a ride home from work. Transcript 
of September 27, 1990, Trial Proceeding [hereinafter referred to as 
"TA"] at 89. While proceeding towards their respective homes, the 
two men noticed a parked pickup truck resembling a truck owned by 
Dale Purdy, another co-worker who had not been at work that day. 
(TA 59, 89). Drew and Evans then stopped by the truck, parked at a 
location different than Purdy's actual residence, to ascertain if 
Purdy was present. (TA 60, 89). 
Although Purdy was not there, his girlfriend, Diane 
Konecny, was in the house situated by the truck. (TA 137). 
According to Dale Purdy, Diane "had taken [his] truck the night 
before; had not come back." (TA 118). She did not return the 
following morning, having apparently spent the night in the home of 
the Defendant/Appellant, Bruce Ellis. (TA 118, 155-56). The truck 
had not been stolen, (TA 73), though Diane had "asked [Ellis] if 
[he] knew [someone] who would buy the truck from her. (TA 136). 
Purdy was thus stranded at his home, unable to travel to work 
without the benefit of his truck. (TA 118). 
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Drew and Evans asked "several people standing [in] front" 
of Ellis7 residence if Mr. Purdy or his girlfriend were around. 
(TA 60). Bruce Ellis approached Drew and Evans and, according to 
the State's witnesses, discussed whether the truck should be sold 
for an "eight ball." (TA 62). Drew and Evans departed for Purdy's 
home to tell him that his truck may be sold. (TA 72). 
After Drew and Evans updated Dale Purdy with news of their 
discovery, the State's witnesses admitted that "Mr. Purdy wasn't 
happy in learning where his truck was[.]" (TA 73). Drew and Evans 
both knew that Purdy was angry about Dianne leaving him. (TA 126). 
The three men returned to confront Bruce Ellis. (TA 74). The men 
did not return to confront Dianne Konecny. (TA 74). 
Drew, Evans, and Purdy returned to a nearby location, the 
driveway where the truck had been moved. (TA 121). According to 
Dale Purdy, he confronted Ellis and asked him if "he had seen Dianne 
or knew anything about the truck parked out there." (TA 122). 
Purdy said Ellis told him, "she was not there, and [the truck] ran 
out of gas[.]" (TA 122). Bruce Ellis, however, testified that he 
told Purdy that Dianne was in the house. (TA 137). "[Purdy] went 
back [in the house] and asked Dianne for the keys and she told him 
no. She told him that if he gave her her kids, she'd give him the 
keys." (TA 137). 
Under either Purdy's or Ellis' version, after Purdy 
returned to Drew and Evans one of two sequences of events occurred. 
When Purdy told them he could not get the keys, Drew and Evans 
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approached Ellis through a front gate while Drew grabbed what 
appeared to be a tire iron and came over the fence at Ellis. 
(TA 138). Steven Drew threatened to "beat my [Ellis7] brains out 
. . . for being with Mr. Purdy's . . . girlfriend [Dianne 
Konecny]." (TA 156). Ellis, drinking a glass of water at the time, 
threw the glass at Steven Drew in an attempt to stop him from coming 
over the fence. (TA 139, 143). Bruce Ellis testified that he threw 
it with his right hand. (TA 143). Ellis is left-handed. (TA 143). 
The alternative scenario submitted by the State alleged 
that after Purdy told Drew and Evans that he could not get the keys, 
the three men were passively content with finding the truck and 
securing its return. (TA 95). This version, however, ignores the 
testimony of Stephen Evans, the State witness who conceded that the 
primary objective of the three men in returning to the scene was for 
"the confrontation . . . with Mr. Ellis" as Mr. Purdy's girlfriend 
"was nowhere around." (TA 74). According to Steven Drew, he calmly 
asked Ellis, "Can we please have the keys so we can get out of 
here?" (TA 110). Drew claimed that Ellis responded with profanity 
and the two men then argued bitterly. (TA 95). Drew also contended 
that Ellis "said, #I ought to kill you,' and he turned and he throws 
the bottle at me and I duck and it catches the back of my leg." 
(TA 95). Drew testified that Ellis "threw it offhand," (TA 107), 
from a distance of "ten to [twelve] feet." (TA 96). 
After Drew was hit, Purdy drove him to the hospital. 
(TA 68, 97). No doctor worked on Drew's leg for "[t]he first hour 
and a half" following his arrival at the hospital. (TA 103). The 
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police apparently had requested photographs of the wound. In one of 
the pictures, State's Exhibit No. 7, the surgeon who treated Steven 
Drew, Dr. David Howe, admitted that medical personnel appeared to be 
"holding the wound in an open position." (TB 9). Taking 
photographs was not a typical emergency room procedure. (TB 9). 
Dr. Howe testified that the injury was not life 
threatening, nor was there any protractive loss of the use of his 
leg. Transcript of September 28, 1990, Trial Proceeding 
[hereinafter referred to as "TB"] at 11. Although the involved 
muscle would not heal "back a hundred percent" and "lose a little 
bit of [its] function[,]" Dr. Howe indicated that "it would be hard 
to test and [to] show that there's much difference[.]" (TB 7). 
Howe believed that the injury was "probably four inches" in length 
and about "an inch and a half to two inches" in depth. (TB 5). A 
permanent scar would result. (TB 7). He also fully explained the 
medical procedure used to treat the wound and the type of body parts 
potentially effected. (TB 5-13). Bruce Ellis cross examined 
Dr. Howe, but he did not dispute the doctor's testimony concerning 
his opinion of the wound. 
Prior to trial, however, Bruce Ellis moved to exclude the 
photographs of the wound on many grounds, one of which addressed the 
anticipated testimony of Dr. Howe. (TA 5). Ellis believed that the 
photographs required an appropriate medical foundation, (TA 99), and 
the information conveyed by the photographs, if any, could be 
established by the more detailed, and less prejudicial, testimony of 
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Dr. Howe. (TA 5). The court denied the motion, though it 
acknowledged the defendant's continuing objection. (TA 4-5, 100). 
After the presentation of evidence, Ellis also moved for a 
directed verdict on the aggravated assault charge and for the 
opportunity to submit the matter to the jury as a simple assault 
charge. (TB 14). The court denied his motion. (TB 16). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in refusing to submit the case to the 
jury under the State's theory, aggravated assault, and the 
defendant's theory, simple assault. While the court may have 
properly refused to grant defendant Ellis' motion for a directed 
verdict on the aggravated assault charge, it nonetheless erred in 
refusing to allow the jury to consider his lesser included offense 
theory. The evidence presented provided a rational basis for the 
simple assault charge, but the trial court's ruling made unavailable 
the defendant's theory as a third option for the jury. The jury 
should not have been forced to choose between aggravated assault or 
acquittal. 
The court also erred in admitting nonessential, cumulative, 
and irrelevant photographs of a wound. The jury instruction on 
aggravated assault focused only on whether the defendant used "force 
likely to produce death or serious bodily injury." The end result, 
and pictures thereof, were irrelevant to proving the element of the 
alleged crime. The only relevant evidence was testimony describing 
Bruce Ellis' throwing motion and the circumstances accompanying the 
altercation between Ellis and Steven Drew, the injured party. 
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By admitting graphic close-ups of the gaping wound, the 
court left open the "strong potential for creating unfair 
prejudice." Moreover, prior to trial Bruce Ellis informed the court 
of less prejudicial means of depicting the information, if any, 
reflected by the photographs. The State's witnesses, particularly 
Dr. Howe, would have addressed any information contained in the 
photographs in a manner less inflammatory than the eight (8" X 11") 
color pictures. The photographs were nonessential and had little or 
no probative value; they unfairly detracted the jury from the true 
focus of the case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING THE JURY TO 
CONSIDER THE DEFENDANT'S THEORY OF THE CASE 
After each party presented their case-in-chief, Mr. Ellis 
made the following objection: 
Your Honor, the court stated yesterday that I might 
make any appropriate motions today rather than 
yesterday when the state initially rested. 
Your Honor, it would be our motion to dismiss the 
aggravated assault count and to ask the court to 
submit this matter to the jury as an assault, a simple 
assault in terms of the state's evidence presented. 
(TB 14) (emphasis added). Bruce Ellis then questioned whether the 
State "met the prima facie burden of [proving] serious bodily injury 
or the likelihood that it [the defendant's actions] would." 
(TB 15). The court denied Mr. Ellis7 motion, believing that the 
jury could find that Ellis' actions were likely to create serious 
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bodily injury. (TB 16). The court erred, however, in not also 
permitting the jury to consider Bruce Ellis' theory of simple 
assault. Cf. State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983) ("The court 
must only decide whether there is a sufficient quantum of evidence 
presented to justify sending the question to the jury, . . . if 
there is a sufficient quantum of evidence to raise a jury question 
regarding a lesser offense, then the court should instruct the jury 
regarding the lesser offense") 
In State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694 (Utah 1980), the Utah 
Supreme Court emphasized the following principles, especially 
applicable to the case at bar: 
We are not concerned with the reasonableness, nor the 
credibility of the defendant's evidence relating to 
his claim of self defense. Each party is, however, 
entitled to have the jury instructed on the law 
applicable to its theory of the case if there is any 
reasonable basis in the evidence to justify it. 
Id. at 695. 
By denying Mr. Ellis' motion, the trial court precluded the 
jury from considering the defendant's theory of the case. Even if 
the jury should have been able to consider the aggravated assault 
charge, the court should not have refused "to submit this matter to 
the jury as an assault, a simple assault in terms of the state's 
evidence presented." (TB 14). The evidence provided the jury with 
a reasonable basis for Ellis' simple assault theory. (TA 135-157). 
The State and the defendant both agreed that Steven Drew 
was hit by a jar thrown by Bruce Ellis. See generally (TA 87-115, 
135-64). The parties disagreed, however, on whether the force used 
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was likely to produce serious bodily injury. The State contended 
that Ellis had thrown the jar at Drew in a manner "likely to produce 
death or serious bodily injury." (TA 45-46) (emphasis added); 
(T 95). 
Bruce Ellis admitted that he threw the jar, (TA 139), and 
that Steven Drew had "suffered a scar" (i.e. bodily injury). 
(TB 15). But Ellis disputed the element of "seriousness,"1 (TB 15), 
as he did not throw it in a manner likely to produce death or 
serious bodily injury. Both parties agreed that Ellis threw it with 
his wrong hand. (TA 107, 143). Even the "victim" viewed Bruce 
Ellis' throwing motion as awkward or unorthodox. Ellis may have had 
"a hell of a fast ball[,]" (TA 107), but Drew nonetheless 
acknowledged that Ellis "threw it offhand." (TA 107). 
The undisputed testimony could have supported either the 
greater offense theory or the lesser included offense theory. The 
jury should have been able to consider the two competing theories in 
order to resolve whether the force used was likely to produce 
"serious bodily injury," as opposed to "bodily injury." See 
also (TA 3) (wherein the court acknowledged that "one of the issues 
is whether or not . . . the force used was likely to produce death 
or serious bodily injury. . . .") 
1
 Ellis also testified that he had acted in self 
defense. (TA 139). 
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During the sentencing phase of the proceedings, the trial 
court conceded the possibility that the jury could have convicted 
Ellis under the lesser included offense: 
[Defense counsel]: . . . This is a case where, as we 
discussed informally, had a lesser included offense 
been submitted, it might well have been that the jury 
would have returned a verdict of simple assault. 
The Court: Probably would have—possibly would have. 
(TB 45).2 
The court's acknowledgement of the defendant's position 
further confirmed the reasonableness of his simple assault theory. 
The court did not dispute Ellis' statements regarding his prior 
objections, nor did it refute the plausibility of his theory. 
Rather, the court's statements reflected the erroneous nature of its 
previous decision. Indeed, the court went on to state: 
this crime is certainly nothing, you know, I would 
approve of, but it's not like—it's not the crime of 
the century, either, you know, get in a fight and you 
throw the bottle at somebody; it's pretty bad, but 
it's not like robbing a 7-Eleven with a gun or 
something. It's horrid, question of bad temper. 
(TB 48). If self defense did not apply, the "bad tempered," 
impulsive act could have been appropriately classified under both 
simple assault and aggravated assault. See Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 76-5-102, -103(1)(b) (1990). 
Not only did the court err in not allowing the jury to 
consider the defendant's theory, the error was compounded by the 
See infra note 3 and accompanying text. 
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fact that the theory pertained to a lesser included offense. The 
standard for determining whether to instruct a jury on a lesser 
included offense is a two pronged analysis. 
[The instruction] must be given if (i) the statutory 
elements of greater and lesser included offenses 
overlap to some degree, and (ii) the evidence provides 
a "rational basis for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of 
the included offense." 
State v. Hansen. 734 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1986) (construing State v. 
Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 159 (Utah 1983)); Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4) 
(1990). 
The first prong was satisfied by the plain language of the 
statutes. The "simple" assault statute states, inter alia; "Assault 
is: (a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily 
injury to another; (b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate 
force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or (c) an act, 
committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily injury 
to another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (1990). The "aggravated 
assault" statute reads in relevant part, "A person commits 
aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in Section 
76-5-102 and he: (a) intentionally causes bodily injury to another; 
or (b) uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or 
other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily 
injury." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1)(b) (1990) (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, the overlapping elements of the greater and lesser 
included offenses satisfied the initial requirement. Cf. State v. 
Hansen. 734 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1986) ("the test is whether the 
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elements overlap at all"); State v. Barkas, 91 Utah 574, 65 P.2d 
1130, 1133 (1937) ("There can be no doubt that a charge of assault 
with intent to do bodily harm, includes also a simple assault, 
because that assault must be proved as a necessary element of the 
greater offense"). 
The second prong, the rational basis test, should be 
considered in light of the principles announced in State v. Hansen, 
734 P.2d 421 (Utah 1986). The Hansen Court interpreted the two 
pronged analysis as one which "should be liberally construed," 734 
P.2d at 424, especially where, as here, the defendant requested the 
lesser included offense instruction.3 Id. at 424 n.5; State v. 
3
 Initially, Bruce Ellis moved "to dismiss the aggravated 
assault count and to ask the court to submit this matter to the Jury 
as an assault, a simple assault in terms of the state's evidence 
presented. (TB 14) (emphasis added). His motion thus contained a 
dual request. After Ellis had questioned the "serious" element of 
the crime, (TB 14-16), the court denied his motion. (TB 16). In 
response to the court's ruling, Ellis noted his present intention 
for the record: "We've not—we're not offering a lesser included 
offense, so I believe that the court should find that a jury cannot 
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the state has proved its case, 
and should direct a verdict of not guilty." (TB 16). 
Upon a cursory review of these statements, Ellis appeared 
to not request the lesser included offense. After a more thorough 
examination of the language used, however, Ellis' statement 
("we're") reflected only his present intention. His initial 
statement ("We've") concerning his past intention was quickly 
corrected in deference to the motion already denied by the court. 
Moreover, he also moved to forward the same theories, aggravated 
assault and simple assault, on the basis that a "not guilty" verdict 
should be rendered for the aggravated assault charge. (TB 16) 
(Ellis moved "for a directive verdict on forwarding the same 
theories, your Honor, that this court should direct a verdict of 
. . . not guilty [on the crime alleged]"); cf. (TA 45). Finally, as 
reflected by subsequent statements by the court, the propriety of 
the defendant's earlier request for a lesser included offense was 
never disputed. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
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Oldrovd. 685 P.2d 551, 553 (Utah 1984); cf. State v. Chesnut. 621 
P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980) ("If there [is] any evidence, however slight, 
on any reasonable theory of the case under which defendant might be 
convicted of a lesser included offense, the trial court must, if 
requested, give an appropriate instruction"). In addition: 
The [two pronged test] of [State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 
152, 159 (Utah 1983)] is not a mere technical rule 
designed to trip up judges and prosecutors. It serves 
a fundamental policy of permitting the jury to find a 
defendant guilty of any offense that fits the facts, 
rather than forcing it to elect between the charges 
the prosecutor chooses to file and an acquittal. As 
we recognized in Baker, "[w]here one of the elements 
of the offense charged remains in doubt but the 
defendant is plainly guilty of some offense, the jury 
is likely to resolve its doubts in favor of 
conviction." 
State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 424-25 (Utah 1986) (citations omitted 
and emphasis in original). 
Assuming, arguendo, the jury properly rejected Bruce Ellis7 
claim of self defense, the jury still could have rationally viewed 
the evidence under either the State's theory, aggravated assault, 
cf. State ex. rel. McElhaney, 579 P.2d 328 (Utah 1978), or 
Mr. Ellis' theory, simple assault. £f. Keeble v. United States, 412 
U.S. 205, 208 (1973) ("it is now beyond dispute that the defendant 
is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense if the 
evidence would permit a jury rationally to find him guilty of the 
lesser offense and acquit him of the greater"); compare Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-102 (1990) with Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1)(b) (1990). 
If Ellis' actions evidenced his intent to stop Steven Drew—or even 
an intent to cause "bodily injury," cf. (T 143), the jury may have 
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nonetheless found that the evidence did not reveal an intent to use 
"force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury." (R 69). 
The rational basis prong was satisfied by the testimony of either 
the State's witnesses or the defendant, all of whom gave different 
interpretations of the "likely to produce serious bodily injury" 
element of the alleged crime. Cf. State v. Oldroyd. 685 P.2d 551, 
553-54 (Utah 1984) (if "overlapping exists and the evidence is 
ambiguous and susceptible to alternative interpretations, the trial 
court must give a lesser included offense instruction if any one of 
the alternative interpretations provides both a 'rational basis for 
a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and 
convicting him of the included offense'"). 
The jury, not having been given the opportunity to consider 
the lesser included offense, was forced to choose between 
"aggravated assault" and "acquittal." If the jury disbelieved the 
claim of self defense, it had no other choice but to convict Bruce 
Ellis of aggravated assault. The court erred in requiring the jury 
to make such a determination. See Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 
205, 213 (1973) ("We cannot say that the availability of a third 
option—convicting the defendant of simple assault—could not have 
resulted in a different verdict"); cf. State v. Hansen. 734 P.2d 
421, 428 (Utah 1986) ("This is exactly the sort of forced choice 
that lesser included offense instructions are designed to avoid, and 
exactly the choice that the jury would not have had to make if [the 
lesser included offense] instruction had been given"); State v. 
Oldroyd. 685 P.2d 551, 555 (Utah 1984) ("if the evidence offered in 
- 15 -
the case would permit a jury to find a defendant guilty of the 
lesser offense and not guilty of the greater, due process requires 
that a lesser included offense instruction must be given"). 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING UNNECESSARILY THE 
PREJUDICIAL PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE VICTIM'S WOUND 
Another motion made by Bruce Ellis concerned the 
admissibility of State's Exhibits Nos. 1-8, the gruesome photographs 
depicting Steven Drew's wound. (TA 99-100, 116-117). The trial 
court declined to exclude the photographs, stating: 
I have looked at the photographs and determined that 
because one of the issues is whether or not the injury 
initiated or the force used was likely to produce 
death or serious bodily injury, since that's the 
issue, the State must prove everything. The 
photographs are relevant. They're not so gruesome in 
my opinion as to outweigh the prejudicial effect; 
doesn't outweigh the probative value, consequently the 
motion to exclude those exhibits will be denied. 
[The State then added]: Your Honor, for the record, I 
believe . . .Ms. Wells indicated to the court that 
she thought the Lafferty homicide standard should 
apply, and it is my understanding the court said no. 
The Court: That's right. I think it is a different 
situation. If you have photographs of a corpse, they 
are not directly relevant because everyone agrees the 
person is dead. How serious the injury was is not an 
issue. Where the issue is, [was] the assault [likely 
to] produce serious bodily injury, I think the 
standard is different and I don't think the Lafferty 
case applies. 
(TA 3-4); (R 69). The court erred in its decision because it 
misunderstood the applicable law. 
In State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988), the Utah 
Supreme Court considered whether "the trial court erred in admitting 
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certain photographs during the [trial]." Id. at 1256. The Court 
initially reviewed the governing evidentiary rule, Utah R. 
Evid. 403, which provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading 
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Utah R. Evid. 403 
cited in Laffertv, 749 P.2d at 1256. The Court interpreted the 
rule's language as requiring more than "a simple balancing of 
probative value and potential for unfair prejudice[.]" 749 P.2d at 
1256. 
our past decisions have recognized that inherent in 
certain categories of relevant evidence is an 
unusually strong propensity to unfairly prejudice, 
inflame, or mislead a jury. Evidence in these 
categories is uniquely subject to being used to 
distort the deliberative process and improperly skew 
the outcome. Consequently, when evidence falling 
within such a category is offered, we have required a 
showing of unusual probative value before it is 
admissible under rule 403. In the absence of such a 
showing, the probative value of such evidence is 
presumed to be "substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice." 
Id. at 1256 (emphasis added). The presumption is therefore in favor 
of excluding the evidence unless the State shows the "unusual 
probative value" of the evidence. Id. In other words, "potentially 
prejudicial photographs are 'generally inappropriate' and should not 
be admitted in evidence unless they have some essential evidentiary 
value that outweighs their unfairly prejudicial impact. . . Only 
after a determination has been made that the photographs have such 
value need the weighing be made." State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 753 
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(Utah 1986) (construing State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60 (Utah 1983)) 
(emphasis added). 
Cloud and Garcia were only two of the many "past decisions" 
referred to by the Laffertv Court as cases subject to the 
"essentiality" requirement. See also State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 
501 (Utah 1986) (statistical evidence of matters not susceptible to 
quantitative analysis, such as veracity of a witness); State v. 
Johns, 615 P.2d 1260, 1264 (Utah 1980) (a rape victim's past sexual 
activities with someone other than the accused); see generally 
State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239, 1256 n.14 (Utah 1988). The 
"essentiality" requirement is not applied differently to homicide 
cases. The requirement applies to any evidence, however relevant, 
which is "being used to distort the deliberative process and 
improperly skew the outcome." Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1256. 
In the case at bar, the trial court never addressed the 
"essentiality" requirement. Instead, the court understated the 
nature of the involved issue. The issue4 was not simply whether 
"the force used was likely to produce death or serious bodily 
injury[.]" (TA 3). Rather, the issue focused on whether the State 
had established the "essential" nature of the photographs and their 
"unusual probative value." 
"The point of the reference to 'essential evidentiary 
value' in the context of potentially prejudicial photographs of the 
4
 The threshold issue pertained to the relevancy of the 
photographs. See infra note 6 and accompanying text. 
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victim's body is that such photographs would generally be 
inappropriate where the only relevant evidence they convey can be 
put before the jury readily and accurately by other means not 
accompanied by the potential prejudice. State v. Garcia. 663 P.2d 
60, 64 (Utah 1983) (emphasis in original); cf. State v. Laffertv, 
749 P.2d 1239, 1257 (Utah 1988) ("An important consideration in 
assessing the probative value of a photograph is whether the facts 
shown by the photograph can be established by other means"). 
During his motion to exclude the photographs, Bruce Ellis 
informed the court that the State had other means available for 
establishing the alleged facts: "we believe the State could prove 
anything that the photographs are likely to show [through] their 
other types of testimony, specifically the testimony of the medical 
expert who will be called who has the ability to utilize diagrams 
and/or models." (TA 5). The court did not comment on the 
defendant's argument, nor did it modify its prior decision to 
exclude the photographs. (TA 5). Thereafter, as predicted by 
Mr. Ellis, the testimony of the State's witnesses established any 
and all relevant5 facts which could have been conveyed by the 
5
 Bruce Ellis objected to the testimony of Dr. David 
Howe, the surgeon who treated Steven Drew, when Howe testified about 
the injury which could have resulted. (TB 6). The doctor's 
testimony was irrelevant to the "likely to produce" element of the 
alleged crime. The doctor knew nothing about the circumstances 
surrounding the incident or the throwing motion used by the 
defendant. His testimony, all in regards to the "end result" or the 
"could-have-been-result," further exacerbated the potential for 
misleading the jury. 
- 19 -
nonessential photographs. The court erred in not finding that the 
"essentiality" requirement, referred to in Laffertv, precluded the 
admissibility of the photographs. The trial court also erred in 
finding that the photographs were "not so gruesome in my opinion as 
to outweigh the prejudicial effect; doesn't outweigh the probative 
value, consequently the motion to exclude those exhibits will be 
denied." (TA 4). As stated above, more than "a simple balancing of 
probative value and potential for unfair prejudice" was required. 
State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239, 1256 (Utah 1988). A "showing of 
unusual probative value" was required before the evidence could be 
admitted. Id. (emphasis added). 
The trial court did not apply the appropriate legal 
analysis. A routine balancing test was not enough. Absent a 
showing of unusual probative value, the photographs were "presumed 
to be 'substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudicef.]'" Id. The State did not make the requisite showing, 
nor did the court make the requisite finding. 
More importantly, the court's statements presumed that the 
photographs had "probative value" when, in fact, they had no 
relevance6 whatsoever under the instructions considered by the 
jury. In order to convict Mr. Ellis, Instruction No. 11 required 
the jury to find, "That said defendant then and there intentionally, 
6
 The photographs and all testimony on anything other 
than the throwing motion of the defendant were irrelevant to the 
"likely to produce" element of the Information and the jury 
instruction. (R 27, 61, 69); (TA 45). 
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knowingly, or recklessly, used a deadly weapon or such means or 
force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury to Steve 
Drew." (R 69) (emphasis added); see Addendum B. The end result was 
irrelevant to the jury's determination. (R 69). In other words, if 
Bruce Ellis had intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly thrown the 
drinking jar but missed Steven Drew, Ellis still could have been 
held accountable for his actions. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-102, 
-103(1)(b) (1990). As explained by the trial court: 
the question is not whether it was serious bodily 
injury, it was whether it was likely. I mean, if 
[someone uses] a gun and it doesn't happen to hurt 
them, that's still aggravated assault. If they shoot 
them with a pea shooter and it kills them, that's not. 
(TB 15). 
The court's statements, though contradicted by its ruling, 
properly focused on the likelihood of the injury—and not on the 
result. (i.e. whether the mens rea and actus reus of the defendant 
combined together in a manner "likely to produce" death or serious 
bodily injury.) Perhaps, a multi-framed pictorial depicting the 
defendant's motion and delivery in throwing the drinking jar would 
have addressed the element of "force likely to produce death or 
serious bodily injury," (R 69), but photographs taken after the 
throw would not have addressed the "likely to produce" element 
stated in the instruction. (R 69). 
Accordingly, the court should not have ruled that the 
photographs of the wound, taken at the hospital, were admissible 
evidence. (TA 3-4). They were neither essential, nor relevant to 
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the State's prima facie case. When the court denied Bruce Ellis' 
motion to exclude the photographs, it opened the door to the "strong 
potential for creating unfair prejudice." State v. Lafferty, 749 
P.2d 1239, 1257 (Utah 1988). The graphic depiction of the wound, 
especially State's Exhibits Nos. 6-8, drew the jury's attention away 
from the appropriate inquiry concerning the "likely to produce" 
element. 
Suppose for a moment, that Bruce Ellis used a pea shooter 
to shoot a pea at Steven Drew's leg. A jury should consider only 
Ellis' mental state and the accompanying conduct at the time of the 
alleged crime. Even if the pea somehow became lodged in Drew's eye 
and blinded him, photographs graphically depicting blood, pus, and a 
damaged cornea would unduly detract the jury's focus from the 
"likely to produce" element of the crime. Pictures of the end 
result would be irrelevant and serve only to inflame the jury. 
Similarly, the eight color photographs (8" X 11") used in 
the present case were unduly emphasized by the State because of 
their irrelevancy to the proceeding. State's Exhibits Nos. 7 and 8, 
and to a lesser extent Exhibit 6, were enlarged closeups of a 
gaping, blood stained wound. Exposing the jury to these "gruesome" 
pictures7 could have easily created "unfair prejudice" with its 
ensuing impact on the jury. 
7
 At the very least, State's Exhibits Nos. 6-8 should 
have been inadmissible. They had the greatest potential for 
prejudicially affecting the jury. 
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"A conviction will not be reversed because of the erroneous 
admission of evidence absent a showing that the error likely 
affected the substantial rights of the defendant." State v. Cloud. 
722 P.2d 750, 754 (Utah 1986). The error cannot be deemed harmless 
because the State in the case at bar, unlike the State in other 
cases, did not have other evidence so overwhelmingly against the 
defendant that the error was unlikely to affect his substantial 
rights. Cf. State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1257 (Utah 1988). 
Bruce Ellis did admit throwing the drinking jar at Steven Drew but 
neither his testimony, nor the testimony of the State's witnesses 
was so overwhelming that, absent the photographs, there was little 
or no likelihood of a different outcome. 
If the jury had been instructed differently, in regards to 
the lesser included offense instruction, see supra Point I, and in a 
manner where the end result could have been relevant to their 
verdict, cf. (R 69), the error may have been harmless. In the 
present situation, however, the sole consideration relevant to the 
jury's fact finding mission pertained to the "force likely to 
produce death or serious bodily injury. . . . " (R 69). 
Consequently, by exposing the jury to photographs which were 
nonessential, cumulative, and irrelevant to the proceeding, their 
affect on the jury cannot be deemed harmless. State v. Cloud, 722 
P.2d 750 (Utah 1986). The trial court therefore abused its 
discretion and committed reversible error when it denied Mr. Ellis' 
motion to exclude State's Exhibits Nos. 1-8. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse his 
conviction and remand this case for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this J>[ day of October, 1990. 
BROOKE C. WEll 
A t t o r n e y for - 'De fendant /Appe l lan t 
RO|T S. FttJINO 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
76-1-402- Separate offenses arising out of single criminal 
episode — Included offenses. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an 
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense. 
76-1-601- Definitions. 
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title: 
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means any item capable of causing death or 
serious bodily injury, or a facsimile or representation of the item, and: 
(a) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads the 
victim to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death or seri-
ous bodily injury; or 
(b) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other man-
ner that he is in control of such an item. 
76-5-102. Assault. 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to 
another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to 
do bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bod-
ily injury to another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
76-5-103. Aggravated assault. 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined 
in Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other 
means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) Aggravated assault is a third degree felony. 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the is-
sues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
ADDENDUM B 
INSTRUCTION NO. H 
Before you can convict the defendant, Bruce Aaron Ellis, 
of the crime of Aggravated Assault, you must believe from all the 
evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every one of the 
following elements of that offense: 
1. That on or about the 29th of June, 1989, in Salt Lake 
County, Utah, the defendant, Bruce Aaron Ellis, assaulted Steve 
Drew; 
2. That said defendant then and there intentionally, 
knowingly, or recklessly, used a deadly weapon or such means or 
force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury to Steve 
Drew. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and all 
of the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, 
you must find the defendant guilty of Aggravated Assault. If, on 
the other hand, you are not convinced of the foregoing elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant not 
guilty. 
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